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I. INTRODUCTION
ON JUNE 30, 1956, TWO commercial airplanes collidedover the Grand Canyon.1 No one saw the crash occur, but
the impact was heard around the world.2 All 128 people aboard
the two planes died in the accident, making it “the deadliest avi-
ation disaster of the time.”3 That morning, the planes, a United
Airlines Douglas DC-7 and a TWA Lockheed Super Constella-
tion, both left California and headed east. Communicating with
two different control stations on the ground, the planes both
chose to fly at 21,000 feet, above the clouds.4 The airspace was
uncontrolled; it was up to the pilots to avoid each other.5 Ac-
cording to the Civil Aeronautics Board investigative agency, the
planes never saw each other coming.6
This deadly crash in 1956 inspired the fledgling aviation in-
dustry to finally get serious about safety in the skies by investing
heavily in an essential mechanism: air traffic control.7 Air traffic
control, specifically defined, “is concerned with (1) keeping air-
craft safely separated while operating in controlled airspace, on
the ground, during takeoff, during assent, enroute and during
approach and landing; and (2) providing preflight and in-flight
services to all pilots.”8 As our aviation industry continues to grow
and change, air traffic control remains indispensable not only in
ensuring passenger safety, but also in organizing the massive
amount of flights that crisscross the United States each day.9
On September, 11, 2001, disaster hit the United States when
four commercial airplanes were hijacked by Islamic terrorists
and crashed into the World Trade Center towers, the Pentagon,
and a field in Pennsylvania.10 While most Americans mourned









8 Anthony W. Adams, The Effects of Air Traffic Control Privatization on Operating
Cost and Flight Safety, 14 J. AVIATION/AEROSPACE EDUC. & RES. 21, 22 (2005).
9 A History of Air Traffic Control, NAT’L AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS ASS’N (2015),
http://www.natca.org/images/NATCA_PDFs/Publications/ATCHistory.pdf
[http://perma.cc/SJ3S-7NG8].
10 9/11 Attacks, HISTORY (2010), http://www.history.com/topics/9-11-attacks
(last visited Sept. 7, 2017)[http://perma.cc/L9W3-AFGC].
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on this tragic day, air traffic controllers sprang into action.11 At
the time of the attacks, there were nearly 5,000 aircraft in Ameri-
can skies.12 The controllers began by halting takeoffs, and then
over the next two and a half tense hours, safely brought every
plane down onto American soil, all while fearing further at-
tacks.13 During this period, American air traffic controllers were
bringing planes down at a rate close to one plane per second,
even while operating with limited staffing as the controllers in
the western part of the country were not yet on duty.14 This feat
of precision and bravery is indicative of both the United States’s
air traffic controllers’ technical abilities and their devotion to
maintaining safety in the skies.15
From the time when the Wright brothers flew the first pow-
ered aircraft over Kitty Hawk, North Carolina, in 1903, to the
establishment of the first commercial air service in 1914, the
United States has always stood at the forefront of the aviation.16
Each day, the American aviation industry serves millions of air
travelers, and the United States should be able to promise each
of these travelers a safe and efficient flight. But for too long, due
to funding deficits and bureaucratic holdups, the United States
has been falling behind in air traffic control, especially in the
areas of efficiency, modernization, and safety, creating more de-
lays and more inconveniences for passengers.17 It is time for the
United States to retake its spot at the top of the aviation indus-
try, and our air traffic control system currently stands as one of
the most significant burdens to the United States’s success in
this endeavor.
The quintessential nature of air traffic control creates much
debate, both in political spheres and in the forum of public





16 Tim Sharp, World’s First Commercial Airline: The Greatest Moments in Flight,
SPACE.COM (July 19, 2012, 1:00 PM), http://www.space.com/16657-worlds-first-
commercial-airline-the-greatest-moments-in-flight.html [http://perma.cc/S9CU-
YHEZ]; The Wright Brothers & The Inventions of the Aerial Age: Inventing a Flying
Machine, SMITHSONIAN NAT’L AIR & SPACE MUSEUM, https://airandspace.si.edu/
exhibitions/wright-brothers/online/fly/1903/ (last visited Sept. 7, 2017) [http:/
/perma.cc/4L2S-Q2A5].
17 See A History of Air Traffic Control, supra note 9; see also Chris Edwards, Re-
forming Air Traffic Control, CATO INST.: TAX & BUDGET BULL. NO. 74 (Feb. 17,
2016), https://www.cato.org/publications/tax-budget-bulletin/reforming-air-
traffic-control [http://perma.cc/LB95-HHRD].
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opinion, about how the function should be managed in order to
maximize safety and efficiency. Currently, the responsibility of
air traffic control rests with the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA). For decades, however, many in the aviation industry have
suggested a possible overhaul of air traffic control by taking it
out of the hands of the federal government and creating a pri-
vate, not-for-profit entity to manage the United States’s air traf-
fic.18 Proponents argue that if air traffic control were to be
moved into the hands of a private corporation, the system could
be modernized and the burden on taxpayers relieved.19 Oppo-
nents, however, cite concerns of the impact this change might
have on safety, relaying the mantra “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix
it.”20 Also paramount to this issue are the legal consequences a
change like this would have, both concerning the state of fed-
eral regulations and the burden of liability. In evaluating the
potential ramifications of privatization, both legal and policy-re-
lated, the answer is clear: Congress should pass an air traffic con-
trol privatization measure, taking the responsibility of air traffic
control away from the FAA and putting it in the hands of a pri-
vate corporation. Privatization will not only result in benefits in-
cluding modernization, more efficiency, and lower cost, but
drafting and debating a new privatization measure would also
give the federal government the flexibility to make decisions
about how regulation, oversight, and liability issues could and
should be handled.
While many pieces have been written about both the policy
ramifications of privatization of air traffic control and the reality
of what privatization would look like in practice, the existing
literature on the subject lacks analysis that looks into the legal
ramifications of privatization in the context of today’s political
18 Dan Reed, Air Traffic Control Privatization Finally Has a Realistic Shot at Being




19 H.R. 4441: Aviation Innovation, Reform, and Reauthorization Act of 2016, GOV-
TRACK (last updated Mar. 11, 2016), https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114
/hr4441/summary [http://perma.cc/7ANZ-QQ8X]; Rep. Bill Shuster, Rep. Bill
Shuster: How to Fix America’s Crumbling Aviation System, FOX NEWS (Feb. 3, 2016),
http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2016/02/03/rep-bill-shuster-how-to-fix-ameri
cas-crumbling-aviation-system.html [http://perma.cc/K8MM-6623].
20 H.R. 4441: Aviation Innovation, Reform, and Reauthorization Act of 2016, supra
note 19; Don’t Privatize Air Traffic Control, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2016), http://www.
nytimes.com/2016/02/15/opinion/dont-privatize-air-traffic-control.html?_r=0
[http://perma.cc/TY7T-ZCRZ].
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climate. With the inception of President Donald J. Trump’s ad-
ministration and with the Republican party retaining control of
Congress, this article looks to the possible outcomes of a likely
pro-business agenda on the aviation industry. This article com-
bines these considerations to look at the big-picture impact of
privatization, using evidence from the experience of privatiza-
tion in other countries as a predictor of how it might operate in
the United States.
To best evaluate the future of air traffic control in the United
States, we must first look to the past. Part II will offer an in-
depth look into the history of air traffic control, starting with its
roots in the mid-1930s and looking through history toward the
initiation of the idea of privatization. Next, Part III will analyze
the current state of the law. This section of the article will dis-
cuss the role of the FAA within the current transportation code,
the Aviation, Innovation, Reform, and Reauthorization (AIRR)
Act (a 2016 House bill that officially put privatization into Con-
gressional debate), as well as the state of air traffic control in
other large nations that have already installed privatized systems.
Part IV will dive deeper into the argument over privatization,
looking at the legal issues and the policy pros and cons. This
analysis will compare air traffic control in the United States to
that of other privatized nations around the world, looking to
whether or not this avenue is feasible in our comparably large
aviation industry. Most importantly, this section will also look to
the legal impact of privatization, considering both the changes
that would occur in the federal government in relation to the
ability to regulate air traffic and the potential liability issues
under different privatization frameworks. Lastly, Part V will con-
clude by discussing the potential impact of a Trump presidency
on the aviation industry.
II. THE HISTORY OF AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL IN
THE UNITED STATES
A. ESTABLISHMENT OF AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL IN THE
UNITED STATES
The story of air traffic control in the United States begins in
the mid-1930s, a period during which the airline industry began
to rapidly grow due to the introduction of new commercial
planes with improved performance and new features that at-
656 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [82
tracted passengers, including air conditioning and heating.21 In
response to the updated planes, more Americans began to show
interest in air travel, and between 1934 and 1939 the number of
passengers using American commercial airlines annually in-
creased from 461,743 to 1,900,000.22 As the skies became more
congested, a need arose to find a way to monitor and control
planes to avoid collisions in the air and on the ground.23 The
responsibility of enacting these protections through air traffic
control was initially taken up by local airports, but conflicts re-
sulted as controllers became overburdened and “near misses”
became commonplace.24 Due to this safety threat, many in the
industry saw the need for a more extensive air traffic control
system.25
In 1935, the Bureau of Air Commerce (Bureau) began the
process of studying and developing a plan to deal with the
United States’s air traffic control needs.26 The Bureau began by
devising regulations, but eventually recommended that an or-
ganization of federal employees be formed, stationed through-
out the country, and tasked with controlling air traffic and
avoiding collisions.27 The Bureau intended that the group
would coordinate all air traffic in the country, especially in busy
areas.28 While the Bureau sought funding for its air traffic con-
trol plan, airlines temporarily took it upon themselves to initiate
the comprehensive air control system.29 Finally, in mid-1936, the
Bureau got the necessary funding and the federal government
took control of operations of the three air traffic control stations
that the airlines had developed in Newark, Chicago, and Cleve-
land.30 As soon as it took over, this newly-formed federal corps
of airway controllers began to modernize air traffic control by
improving communication with pilots, regulating flying instru-
21 Theresa L. Kraus, Celebrating 75 Years of Federal Air Traffic Control, FED. AVIA-








27 Id. at 2–4.
28 Id. at 4.
29 Id. at 4–5.
30 Id. at 5.
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ments, and creating systems to organize flight information.31
The Bureau also immediately expanded the air traffic control
network, opening stations in nine more cities by the end of
1939.32
B. AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL AND THE FAA
The air traffic control system continued to grow and develop
over the next two decades, but the most significant change came
in 1958 when Congress passed the Federal Aviation Act, creating
the FAA.33 This act tasked the FAA with, among other things,
sole responsibility for air traffic control.34 In addition to passing
the transformative act, Congress appropriated $250 million to
initiate much-needed upgrades to the previously underfunded
air traffic control system, largely in response to the tragic 1956
crash.35 This money allowed the new FAA to apply military tech-
nologies, like radar surveillance, to commercial aviation.36 Com-
puterized systems also began to develop during this time,
automating and further modernizing air traffic control.37
Over the coming decades, however, problems continued to
plague the air traffic control industry.38 As air travel became
more and more popular, air traffic controllers again became
overburdened and their equipment obsolete.39 Strikes in the
1980s rocked the industry.40 The FAA tried to relieve pressure by
restructuring flight schedules and control towers, but it did not
have the funding to make serious changes.41 Finally, in 1996,
Congress passed legislation to reform the FAA and increase
budget allowances to fund updates to technology and pay
scales.42
Today, more than 52,000 federal employees serve the air traf-
fic control industry in some capacity, making up half of the
FAA’s workforce.43 There are air traffic control facilities in all
31 Id. at 6–8.
32 Id. at 10.










43 Adams, supra note 8, at 23.
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fifty states utilizing modern technologies to ensure seamless pro-
tection for all flights across the country.44 Air traffic control
workers experience an intensive training process to learn how to
handle the technical, high-stress job on which thousands of lives
depend every day.45 As of 2005, the United States is the only
country in which all air traffic control, both military and com-
mercial, falls under the purview of one civil air traffic control
system.46
C. AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL PRIVATIZATION
For more than twenty years, aviation experts have been pro-
posing changes to the air traffic control system.47 As early as the
late 1980s, the idea of instituting a privatized air traffic control
system began to circulate in the Unites States.48 These ideas
came in response to continuing concerns of flight delays,
quickly outdated technology, and the financial burden that the
air traffic control system puts on the government.49 In 1994,
President Clinton’s administration put forth a proposal “to
restructure the nation’s air traffic control system as a quasi-gov-
ernment corporation to be run like a private business” with the
goal of creating a corporation that had the potential to be “effi-
cient, financially self-sufficient, financially able to respond to
rapid change, and technologically superior.”50 This proposal,
and others, failed because of “warring and vested interest[s]”
within the industry.51
Other countries, however, have taken advantage of the con-
cept of privatization.52 Some countries, like Canada and the
United Kingdom, have instituted models in which air traffic con-
trol is completely privatized, while others, like Germany and
France, manage air traffic control through companies owned by
their respective governments.53 While all of the countries that
have privatized have seen generally positive results, Canada’s
private system, called Nav Canada, has been especially success-
44 Id.
45 A History of Air Traffic Control, supra note 9.
46 Adams, supra note 8, at 23.
47 Reed, supra note 18.
48 Id.
49 Adams, supra note 8, at 21.
50 Id.
51 Reed, supra note 18.
52 Id.
53 Don’t Privatize Air Traffic Control, supra note 20.
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ful.54 Since privatization in 1996, the not-for-profit organization
has been able to handle fifty percent more traffic using twenty-
five percent fewer employees.55 Nav Canada has also been able
to modernize and develop new air traffic control technologies
that have generated profit through global sales.56 Though the
United States has consistently been slow to come around to
changes in air traffic control throughout its history, many in the
industry have come to realize the potential benefits of privatiza-
tion, while watching the models employed in countries like Ca-
nada thrive.57
III. THE AIRR ACT AND THE LAW TODAY
A. AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL UNDER FEDERAL LAW
Since 1958, air traffic control has remained under the author-
ity of the federal government and under the guidance of the
FAA.58 Federal law codifies the responsibilities and duties of the
FAA within the Transportation Code, specifically in 49 U.S.C.
§ 106, creating an Air Traffic Services Committee to “oversee
the administration, management, conduct, direction, and super-
vision of the air traffic control system.”59 The statute lists the
general responsibilities of the Committee as “oversight” and
“confidentiality,” while the specific responsibilities are “strategic
plans,” “modernization and improvement,” “operational plans,”
“management,” and “budget.”60 This wide-reaching statute uses
broad language to bring all of the powers and duties of air traf-
fic control into one centralized organization within the federal
government.61 Other important regulations of how air traffic
control should be operated, including details about safety and
fees, however, are sprinkled throughout the transportation
code, including within Subtitle VII, which addresses aviation
programs.62
54 Justin Bachman, Should the U.S. Privatize Air Traffic Control?, BLOOMBERG





58 A History of Air Traffic Control, supra note 9.
59 49 U.S.C. § 106(p)(7)(D)(i) (2012).
60 Id. § 106(p)(7)(D)–(E).
61 Id. § 106(p)(7).
62 See, e.g., id. § 44506 (2012) (mandating that the FAA conduct research into
methods to ensure that the training and practices of air traffic controllers create
the safest possible air traffic control system).
660 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [82
B. THE AIRR ACT
In February of 2016, Representative Bill Shuster (R-PA) intro-
duced the H.R. 4441, the Aviation Innovation, Reform, and
Reauthorization Act (AIRR Act), a bill which would revolution-
ize the aviation industry.63 Among other major proposed innova-
tions, the most controversial proposition of the bill was to take
responsibility for air traffic control away from the federal gov-
ernment, instead creating a private, not-for-profit organization
to manage the task.64 The contentious proposal has drawn
strong opinions on both sides.65 The stated purpose of the priva-
tization measure is “to provide for the more efficient operation
and improvement of air traffic services.”66 The newly-formed
corporation would manage or contract to manage all air traffic
services in the United States and airspace controlled by the
United States with the exception of military operations.67 The
eleven-member Board of Directors of the corporation would be
comprised of representatives of six different groups as follows:
(1) The CEO. (2) 2 Directors appointed by the Secretary. (3) 4
Directors nominated by the Nominating Member appointed by
the principal organization representing mainline air carriers. (4)
2 Directors nominated by the Nominating Member appointed by
the principal organization representing noncommercial owners
and recreational operators of general aviation aircraft. (5) 1 Di-
rector nominated by the Nominating Member appointed by the
principal organization engaged in collective bargaining on be-
half of air traffic controllers employed by the Corporation. (6) 1
Director nominated by the Nominating Member appointed by
the principal organization representing the largest certified col-
lective bargaining representative of airline pilots.68




66 Aviation Innovation, Reform, and Reauthorization Act of 2016, H.R. 4441,
114th Cong. § 201 (2016).
67 Id. § 90302(c) (“After the date of transfer, no entity, other than the Corpo-
ration, is authorized or permitted to provide air traffic services within United
States airspace or international airspace delegated to the United States, except
for- (1) the Department of Defense, as directed by the President; (2) entities to
which the United States has delegated certain air traffic service responsibilities;
and (3) entities with which the Corporation has contracted for the provision of
air traffic services.”).
68 Id. § 90306(b).
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The requirements for and terms of these directors are specifi-
cally detailed.69 The Board would manage all functions of the
corporation including strategic planning and budgetary opera-
tions.70 The corporation would be largely funded by fees col-
lected from air travelers in the United States in conjunction with
the offering of air traffic services, and the Board would assess
and modify those fees as necessary.71
After the AIRR Act was introduced in the House on February
3, 2016, it was immediately referred to the House Committee on
Transportation and the Subcommittee on Aviation.72 A commit-
tee consideration and mark-up session was quickly held after-
ward on February 11.73 After discussion, the committee ordered
the bill to be amended by a vote of thirty-two to twenty-six.74
While interest in enacting some form of the privatization was
high, the House found itself facing a deadline: funding for the
FAA was set to expire at the end of March 2016.75 Knowing that
the privatization measure would not be passed within a month,
members of the House moved forward drafting a new bill to
push through other provisions of the AIRR Act, namely to
reauthorize and refund the FAA.76
69 See id. §§ 90306–09.
70 Id. § 90306(k)(2) (“The Board shall be responsible for actions of the Corpo-
ration, including the following matters: (A) Adoption of an annual budget. (B)
Approval of a strategic plan and updates thereto. (C) Authorization for issuance
of indebtedness. (D) Assessment, modification, and collection of charges and
fees to air traffic services users. (E) Hiring of the Interim CEO and CEO. (F)
Adoption and amendment of the bylaws of the Corporation.”).
71 Id. § 90311 (“Beginning on the date of transfer, and subject to section
90502, the Corporation may assess and collect charges and fees from any air traf-
fic services user for air traffic services provided by the Corporation in United
States airspace or international airspace delegated to the United States.”).
72 Aviation Innovation, Reform, and Reauthorization Act of 2016, 114th Bill
Tracking H.R. 4441, LEXISNEXIS (Feb. 11, 2016).
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Pia Bergqvist, ATC Privatization Bill Thrown Out: FAA Maintains Control Over
Air Traffic Control, For Now, FLYING MAG. (Mar. 1, 2016), http://www.flyingmag.
com/atc-privatization-bill-thrown-out [http://perma.cc/FD39-P279].
76 Andy Pasztor, Senate Overwhelmingly Passes Bipartisan FAA Bill without Air-Traf-
fic Control Privatization: Legislation Aims to Beef up Airport Security and Promote Wide-
spread Use of Commercial Drones, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 19, 2016, 1:57 PM), http://www.
wsj.com/articles/senate-set-to-pass-bipartisan-faa-bill-without-air-traffic-control-
privatization-1461070930 [http://perma.cc/7HY9-92G5].
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C. STATE OF PRIVATIZATION MEASURES TODAY
While devising a series of measures that, in the end, extended
funding through September 2017, the Senate diverged from the
House by expressing “stiff opposition” to major changes to the
air traffic control system.77 Because of the relatively short fund-
ing extension, however, debate over the future of the FAA is
likely to reignite in the coming years78 as Congress searches for
more permanent solutions for the future of the FAA.79 After the
passage of the 2016 FAA funding bill, Schuster pledged to con-
tinue to pursue privatization, saying a change to the air traffic
control system “is absolutely necessary to end the unacceptable
status quo at the FAA and to ensure the future of America’s avia-
tion system.”80 According to Representative John Mica (R-Fla.),
another supporter of privatization legislation, future attempts by
Congress to enact privatization measures are likely to explore
ways to compromise on privatization to appease the concerns of
the Senate, including “keeping the financing under government
control and contracting oversight to an independent agency.”81
IV. WOULD PRIVATIZATION WORK IN THE UNITED
STATES? AN ANALYSIS
Despite the obstacles preventing the passage of the 2016 air
traffic control proposal, the debate over privatization remains at
the forefront of the minds of those in the aviation industry, and
the question rings anew: would privatization work in the Unites
States? Both the proponents and opponents of this measure
have strong policy reasoning behind their positions, and of addi-
tional important concern are the legal issues associated with this
matter, including the effect on federal regulation of the aviation
industry and the assignment of potential liability for injuries or
collisions resulting from air traffic control mistakes. Taking all
77 Susan Carey & Andy Pasztor, Senate Passes FAA Reauthorization Bill, WALL ST.
J. (July 13, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/senate-passes-faa-reauthorization-
bill-1468437144 [http://perma.cc/4SKU-DG8N].
78 While early 2017 attempts to pass air traffic control legislation were unsuc-
cessful, the conversation is not over. See Bart Jansen, Senate Panel Rejects Air-Traffic
Control Privatization, USA TODAY (July 25, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/travel/flights/todayinthesky/2017/07/25/senate-panel-rejects-air-traffic-
control-privatization/508479001/ [perma.cc/H6Y9-33KW].
79 Carey & Pasztor, supra note 77.
80 Pasztor, supra note 76.
81 Susan Ferrechio, Can Air Traffic Control Ever Be Privatized?, WASH. EXAMINER
(May 2, 2016, 12:01 AM), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/can-air-traffic-
control-ever-be-privatized/article/2590071 [http://perma.cc/53PF-VMEE].
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of this into account, this article argues that privatization is the
proper next step for the American aviation industry, especially
in the face of the overwhelming success of privatization in other
nations around the world. This analysis will begin by arguing in
favor of privatization due to the flexibility of the model under
federal regulation and then will look to the favorable liability
situation that would result from privatization. Next, this analysis
will evaluate the policy pros and cons of privatization, finally re-
lying on a look at privatization models around the world to ex-
emplify the benefits of privatization.
A. PRIVATIZED AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL UNDER FEDERAL
AVIATION REGULATIONS
A significant question in the debate over air traffic control
privatization is as follows: what would and should the role of the
federal government be in the new system? More specifically in a
legal context, would the federal government have any power to
oversee or regulate this new system? As mentioned above in Part
II above, different models of privatization involve different levels
of government intervention.82 After the failure of the 2016 AIRR
Act, Republicans in the house, including Representative Mica,
have indicated that legislators might be open to pursing a com-
promise that could leave some aspects of air control, specifically
financing, under government control.83 While this situation is
not ideal in the minds of many privatization supporters, who
would prefer a set-up that creates an air traffic control corpora-
tion completely independent of the federal government, com-
promise is probably the more appropriate solution as it is likely
to garner more support.
Making air traffic control independent from the federal gov-
ernment would certainly have its benefits in regard to federal
regulation. For one, it would lift “an often-ineffective and cum-
bersome federal bureaucracy” off the backs of the aviation in-
dustry, offering more flexibility to innovate.84 It would
additionally free up billions of tax dollars as air traffic control
moves to a fee-based system.85 Further, privatization would allow
the FAA to focus on its most crucial purpose: ensuring the safety
82 See Don’t Privatize Air Traffic Control, supra note 20.
83 Ferrechio, supra note 81.
84 H.R. 4441: Aviation Innovation, Reform, and Reauthorization Act of 2016, supra
note 19.
85 Id.
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of air travel.86 Also importantly, separation would insulate air
traffic control from government shutdowns, preventing travel
disasters when the government hits an all-too-frequent point of
gridlock.87 Despite these positive effects of privatization related
to federal regulation, however, opponents, backed by a report
by the Congressional Research Service, worry that privatization
could bring about legal challenges as to “whether Congress
handed too much power to the corporation and whether the
federal government maintained enough surveillance of the[ ]
system.”88
The best thing about the privatization model, however, is that
it is flexible. As Congress toys with the idea of privatization, legis-
lators could debate and customize exactly how this private cor-
poration would function in keeping with both the goals of the
aviation industry and the concerns over a need for legislative
oversight. Legislators could devise a system not only with the
modernization benefits of private industry, discussed infra, but
also with the safety protections of the tried-and-true FAA system.
Additionally, as Representative Mica indicated, financing could
stay within the federal government to some desired extent if it
would ease the concerns of some opponents who worry that an
important safety industry could end up underfunded.89 Without
a current proposal on the table, it is difficult to predict exactly
how federal government regulations would interplay with a new
air traffic control system, but this uncertainty should not stand
in the way of pursuing a more effective system.
To devise a system that would appease the aviation industry
while getting enough legislators on board to pass a privatization
measure, the compromise drafters should consider looking to
the models of Germany and France, where air traffic control is
centralized into a corporation with the singular task of operat-
ing the air traffic control industry, but that corporation is owned
by the government and is subject to government oversight and
management.90 While a government-owned model might com-
promise the benefits that usually accompany a move into the
private industry, an air traffic control corporation would already
86 Shuster, supra note 19.
87 Bart Jansen, House Transportation Chairman: Privatize Air-Traffic Control, USA
TODAY (June 15, 2015, 1:29 PM), http://usat.ly/1SikaPS [http://perma.cc/
FD29-EYPC].
88 Id.
89 See Ferrechio, supra note 81.
90 See Don’t Privatize Air Traffic Control, supra note 20.
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lack some of these benefits as it would not have shareholders
encouraging efficiency and would not be subject to market com-
petition, as discussed infra.91 While strong proponents like Rep-
resentative Shuster might be hesitant to compromise on strict
privatization, Congress might have to sacrifice some indepen-
dence and flex the concept to allow for an appropriate amount
of federal regulation and oversight for the benefit of the indus-
try. While part of the cumbersome bureaucracy, the FAA would
no doubt pursue the goal of ensuring air travel safety in
whatever role it had in the new industry, a goal that would per-
fectly align with the mission of a private air traffic control
corporation.
B. LIABILITY ISSUES: WHO IS RESPONSIBLE?
Another legal matter of important consideration is liability.
Prior to 1944, an air traffic controller could be held personally
liable for negligence that led to a collision or other air traffic
control mistake.92 In 1944, however Congress passed the Federal
Tort Claims Act (FTCA) under which it waived its immunity to
be sued in front of a federal court.93 This statutory provision is
complex, oft-litigated, and ripe with exceptions, the most signifi-
cant of which being that the U.S. government cannot be held
liable for failure to perform a “discretionary function.”94 While
not specifically defined, the Supreme Court has held this “dis-
cretionary function” exception to apply, generally speaking,
“where there is room for policy judgment” in decision making
91 See Max B. Sawicky, Low Visibility: The Fate of Air Traffic Control Privatization,
CTR. FOR ECON. & POL’Y RES. 1 (Feb. 2016), http://cepr.net/images/stories/re
ports/low-visibility-atc-privatization-2016-02.pdf [https://perma.cc/HQ3G-RR
SU].
92 Chrystel Erotokritou, The Legal Liability of Air Traffic Controllers, 4 INQUIRES J.
1 (2012), http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/613/the-legal-liability-of-air-
traffic-controllers [http://perma.cc/DZ7A-58FE].
93 Id.; see also, Federal Tort Claims Act 28 U.S.C.S. 1346(b)(1) (2012)
(“[T]he district courts . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil
actions on claims against the United States, for money damages,
accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property,
or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act
or omission of any employee of the Government while acting
within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances
where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or
omission occurred.”).
Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2012).
94 Erotokritou, supra note 92.
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by an employee of the government.95 Experts say, however, that
air traffic controllers rely on their extensive training rather than
policy to make judgements and decisions, therefore the “discre-
tionary function” exception does not apply in the context of air
traffic control.96 Because of this, courts have held that “the con-
troller owes a duty of care to the pilot and that the US govern-
ment can be vicariously liable on their [sic] behalf.”97 This
government liability, of course, would change drastically if the
responsibility of air traffic control was delegated to a private
corporation.
The text of the 2016 privatization proposal, the AIRR Act, in-
cluded a provision that the private “[c]orporation . . . may sue
or be sued.”98 This provision indicates that the congressional
proponents of privatization would intend to remove air traffic
control liability from the federal government and put it on the
shoulders of the newly-formed corporation.99 In other countries
with privatized systems, the private organizations have the bur-
den of vicarious liability for torts committed by their employ-
ees.100 Under the Swiss model, the government of Switzerland
steps in to offer compensation to victims only when the private
organization does not have the fiscal ability to do so.101 In the
United Kingdom, however, the government has no duty to its
private organization as to liability and provides no financial
assistance.102
If the United States relies on a privatization model that cre-
ates a corporation totally independent from federal control, it is
likely that the United States could devise a privatization propo-
sal that shifts vicarious liability to the newly-formed corporation,
which, assuming the corporation is sufficiently funded to handle
lawsuits, would be another source of savings for the federal gov-
ernment—a positive impact of privatization. However, as dis-
cussed supra in regard to federal regulations, it is probably in
the best interest of privatization proponents to compromise on
their model and to accept some form of federal regulation over
95 Id.; Dalehite v. U.S., 346 U.S. 15, 36 (1953).
96 Erotokritou, supra note 92.
97 Id.
98 Aviation Innovation, Reform, and Reauthorization Act of 2016, H.R. 4441,
114th Cong. § 90310(a)(5) (2016).
99 See id.
100 Erotokritou, supra note 92.
101 Id.
102 Id.
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the new air traffic control corporation, likely in relation to over-
sight and management. In this case, delegation of liability would
become more complicated as potential plaintiffs might attempt
to bring claims under the FTCA for any air traffic control-re-
lated suits due to the federal government’s continued involve-
ment in the industry.103 To avoid this, drafters of the
privatization measure must make clear that air traffic controllers
and other personnel are employees of the private corporation
and not of the federal government.104 By ensuring this clarity,
drafters would be able to appease privatization opponents with
compromise while still welcoming the liability benefits that
privatization could enact on the federal budget and on the gov-
ernment’s vulnerability to suit.
C. IMPACT OF THE STATE ACTION REQUIREMENT
In a discussion of a liability framework, it is important to con-
sider the potential impact of the State Action Requirement. The
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution says that “[n]o state
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due pro-
cess of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.”105 Clear in the language of this
provision is that it only applies to “state actors;” specifically, indi-
viduals are only protected from violations of their constitutional
rights perpetrated by actors of the state.106 The definition of a
“state actor,” however, can be more complex than it appears.107
The Supreme Court has consistently held that even if private, an
entity is liable for violation of a person’s constitutional rights if
that entity, or a representative thereof, is “acting on behalf of
the government or perform[ing] . . . a duty that is traditionally
carried out by the state.”108 Because air traffic control, through-
out most of its history, has been handled by the state, it could
likely fall into this category of “a duty that is traditionally carried
out by the state,” making any private entity that manages this
103 See Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2012).
104 See id. The federal government is only liable under the FTCA for actions of
“employee[s] of the Government.” Id.
105 U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, § 1.
106 Julie K. Brown, Less is More: Decluttering the State Action Doctrine, 73 MO. L.
REV. 561, 562 (2008).
107 Id. at 563.
108 Id. at 564.
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responsibility a state actor in the context of the Fourteenth
Amendment.109 Under this assumption, an air traffic control
corporation would hold not only vicarious tort liability, but addi-
tionally constitutional liability for any violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment. While this would create a burden of
liability beyond that of an average private corporation, it is no
different than the liability burden currently saddling the federal
government. Whether air traffic control is managed by the FAA
or a private corporation, liability expenses would likely remain
the same, and would be factored into any budget just as they are
now. However, if privatization succeeds in its goals of creating a
safer air traffic control industry with fewer safety-related inci-
dents, there would likely be fewer lawsuits and therefore fewer
liability expenses.110
D. POLICY PROS OF PRIVATIZATION
There is widespread support for the idea of air traffic control
privatization.111 Not only does the measure find roots of support
in Congress, within both the Republican and, to a lesser extent,
the Democratic parties, but it is also supported by three former
transportation secretaries as well as President Obama’s first FAA
Administrator.112 Importantly, within the aviation industry, the
measure is supported by every major airline with the exception
of Delta Air Lines.113 Further, both Airlines for America, a group
representing the airlines, and the National Air Traffic Control-
lers Association, the union representing the United States’s
11,000 air traffic controllers, lobby for privatization.114
One of the most often cited reasons for privatization of air
traffic control is that it would save taxpayer money.115 Because
the system, as proposed by the AIRR Act, would be fee-based,
only air travelers would shoulder the burden of paying for air
109 See id.
110 See Adams, supra note 8, at 26; Shuster, supra note 19. As discussed, reports
both by the U.S. government and global entities claim that privatization in other
countries has led to better safety records.
111 Kathryn A. Wolfe & Heather Caygle, Shuster’s FAA Breakup Bill Readies for




114 Reed, supra note 18.
115 H.R. 4441: Aviation Innovation, Reform, and Reauthorization Act of 2016, supra
note 19.
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traffic control.116 Fees levied on airline tickets would, by nature,
be proportional to a traveler’s frequency of use of the system,
but would certainly have an impact on the price of air travel and
might inhibit some from being able to afford it. Relieving the
financial burden on the federal government is one of the largest
benefits of the private industry, freeing up more money for im-
portant government functions and preventing increase of the
deficit. The FAA is currently budgeted to spend $16.4 billion in
2017, a total which would decrease greatly if the responsibility of
air traffic control was moved into the private sector.117 Further,
proponents contend that the new model “would save billions of
dollars and provide more stable funding than congressional
appropriations.”118
Another aspect that proponents emphasize is moderniza-
tion.119 According to Representative Shuster, “[t]he FAA’s at-
tempts at modernization have been extremely costly and
unquestionably ineffective; government watchdogs have fre-
quently highlighted the various missteps, cost overruns, and set-
backs.”120 Further, “[t]he Department of Transportation’s
Inspector General has stated that the implementation costs for
NextGen (which is the FAA’s latest modernization plan) were
initially estimated at $40 billion, but could ultimately cost as
much $120 billion and may take an additional decade, by which
time the technology will likely be obsolete.”121 Beyond these
budget impasses, the FAA’s failure to modernize has put the
United States behind on the world stage.122 Former transporta-
tion secretaries and President Obama’s FAA Administrator ex-
pressed in a letter that “[t]he U.S. no longer has the most
modern equipment, the most efficient airplane routings or the
best technology of any of the world’s air traffic control provid-
ers.”123 Airlines including American and Southwest have come
out to say that they do not believe that the FAA will ever be able
to “complete a long-delayed airspace modernization program,”
116 See Aviation Innovation, Reform, and Reauthorization Act of 2016, H.R.
4441, 114th Cong. § 90311 (2016).
117 Kerry Lynch, U.S. Senate Clears FAA FY2017 Budget, AIN ONLINE (May 22,
2017, 4:34 AM), http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/business-aviation/
2016-05-22/us-senate-clears-faa-fy2017-budget [http://perma.cc/HZ5A-WYZ2].
118 Jansen, supra note 87.
119 Shuster, supra note 19.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Wolfe & Caygle, supra note 111.
123 Id.
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but they agree that a privatized organization could do so be-
cause it would be “more efficient and financially stable.”124
Generally, it is understood that the private sector is better at
innovating than the federal government due to the cumber-
some nature of the bureaucracy.125 For this reason, it is sensible
to assume that a private organization with a singular purpose,
not to mention greater financial incentives, might be able to
find a way to bring American air traffic control technology into
the twenty-first century in a more economically feasible way than
the federal government has been able to do. A new private sys-
tem “will have the agility to innovate and adapt that is lacking in
any government agency, as well as the flexibility to borrow re-
sources necessary to achieve the modern [air traffic control] sys-
tem and air transportation network that continues to elude
us.”126 Not to mention that if a private sector air traffic control
corporation could create new technologies that could be sold to
other countries around the world, this could generate profit to
alleviate the costs of the modernized systems.127 As the CEO of
Nav Canada has noted, “governments are not good at running
big IT projects,” so maybe the private sector could do better.128
Lastly, proponents see this change as necessary because a pri-
vate system would be better able to handle a growing air travel
market.129 The number of annual passengers is approaching
one billion in the United States, and the current system is not
set up to handle that level of air traffic.130 Proponents are con-
cerned that without radical change, “the headaches air travelers
know too well already—delays, lost bags, cancelled flights—will
become more prevalent.”131 By increasing the air traffic control
system’s capacity to handle larger numbers of flights, airlines
could increase their volume of flights each day while maximiz-
ing efficiency of flight plans through more effective use of air-
124 Justin Bachman & Michael Sasso, Airlines to Trump: Block Rivals and Privatize
Air Traffic Control, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2016-11-09/airlines-to-trump-block-rivals-and-privatize-air-traffic-
control [http://perma.cc/5GM8-VFTC].
125 See H.R. 4441: Aviation Innovation, Reform, and Reauthorization Act of 2016,
supra note 19.
126 Shuster, supra note 19.
127 See Bachman, supra note 54.
128 Id.
129 Shuster, supra note 19.
130 Id.
131 Id.
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space.132 With these major changes, private control of air traffic
could have a direct result on the daily experience of American
air travelers.133 While no one claims that air traffic control priva-
tization would solve all of our air travel problems, many in the
industry acknowledge that “privatization needs to be done as a
necessary first step toward eventually ending this country’s enor-
mous and chronic problem with flight delays.”134
E. POLICY CONS OF PRIVATIZATION
Among the opponents of privatization are leaders from both
parties in the House and Senate committees responsible for
managing the FAA’s budget, in addition to many congressional
Democrats.135 While privatization is generally supported in the
aviation industry, with the narrow exception of Delta Air Lines
and some unions, these powerful politicians stand in the way of
passage of meaningful reform legislation.136
The primary concerns of opponents of air traffic control
privatization relate to safety. Opponents worry that transitioning
air traffic control to an entirely new system might result in safety
lapses that would leave air travelers at risk.137 Further, in separat-
ing commercial and private air traffic out from control over mil-
itary and law enforcement air traffic, which likely would remain
in the hands of the Department of Defense under any privatiza-
tion proposal, there is a threat that communication problems
could cause at best, inefficiency, and at worst, collisions.138
While these concerns are certainly valid, and while safety should
be the premiere consideration when devising an air traffic con-
trol system, there is no evidence that private air control would
be any less safe.139 The communication and protection measures
in place today would continue to function, and the experienced
air traffic controllers would continue to perform their duties as
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 See Reed, supra note 18.
135 Id.
136 Ted Reed, Airlines Want Privatized Air Traffic Control but Delta Remains Op-
posed, THESTREET (Sept. 16, 2016, 9:25 AM), https://www.thestreet.com/story/
13741799/1/airlines-want-privatized-air-traffic-control-but-delta-remains-opposed
.html [http://perma.cc/N4UE-JUF5].
137 H.R. 4441: Aviation Innovation, Reform, and Reauthorization Act of 2016, supra
note 19.
138 Id.
139 See Shuster, supra note 19; Adams, supra note 8, at 25 (privatization mea-
sures in other countries have not resulted in a decrease in safety).
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they do today, only under the umbrella of a different em-
ployer.140 Further, reports both by the U.S. government and
global entities claim that privatization in other countries has led
to better safety records.141 Without evidence of a negative im-
pact on safety, this concern should not stand in the way of inno-
vation in the industry.
Opponents further look to the economic impact of privatiza-
tion. First, even though it would be privatized, the proposed air
traffic control system would not merit the normal benefits of the
private sector.142 Because air traffic control is centralized into
one entity, there is no competitive market.143 The infrastructure
and expertise of the current system could not be matched, so
competition is unlikely to arise.144 Further, because the corpora-
tion would not have shareholders, opponents question the in-
centive for minimizing costs and maximizing efficiency.145
There are concerns about the guiding principles of this not-for-
profit organization when operating outside of government
control.146
Next, while private sector operations have the potential for
big gains, they also can incur big losses if managed improp-
erly.147 Opponents of privatization contend that there is danger
in subjecting such an important industry to the ups and downs
of the economy without government oversight ensuring finan-
cial consistency.148 According to a report by the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) estimating the potential cost of air traffic
control privatization, the measure would have the potential to
raise the deficit by up to $19.8 billion over the next ten years,
along with increases in spending and discretionary outlays.149
These numbers, however, presented with minimal description
or context, are deceptive.150 The CBO explains that even though
140 See Adams, supra note 8, at 23–25.
141 Shuster, supra note 19.








149 H.R. 4441, Aviation Innovation, Reform, and Reauthorization Act of 2016: Cost
Estimate, CONG. BUDGET OFF. (Mar. 9, 2016), https://www.cbo.gov/publication/
51362 [http://perma.cc/A92W-PBMT].
150 See id.
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the new air traffic control system would be managed and fi-
nanced as a private entity, a 1967 budgetary guidance measure
instructs that the corporation’s cash flow should be recorded in
the federal budget because the entity would “effectively act as an
agent of the federal government in carrying out a regulatory
function,” a seemingly misleading method of record-keeping.151
Further, the CBO concedes that its calculations evaluate the
AIRR Act as isolated legislation, not in the context of other fed-
eral regulations and activities.152 Therefore, these estimations do
not offer much clarity as to the true financial impact of this
legislation.
Another main concern of opponents is that “[t]here are too
many unanswered questions about this proposal.”153 While stud-
ies can look at the impact of privatization on other countries,
the United States, in many respects, represents a unique case
because of its significantly large size.154 It is hard to predict the
exact impact any small change on the air traffic control system
might have on the aviation industry, much less a complete over-
haul. Further, there is no concrete evidence that the new pro-
posed system would be any more effective than the current
one.155 In fact, some argue that rather than allowing the system
to quickly innovate and modernize, privatization would serve
only to disrupt the FAA’s current work to increase flight capacity
and reduce delays, slowing down the timeline for improve-
ments.156 The final significant con to privatization is related: why
remake a system that, strictly speaking, isn’t broken?157 While
the air traffic control system certainly has its problems, the most
significant being outdated equipment, cost on taxpayers, and
rampant flight delays, the system as it stands generally functions
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 CBO: Privatizing Air Traffic Control Would Increase Budget Deficit, 58 No. 12
GOV’T CONTRACTOR 98 (Mar. 23, 2016).
154 Compare U.S. DEP’T. BUREAU OF TRANSPORTATION STATISTICS, BTS 18-16,
2015 U.S.-Based Airline Traffic Data (Mar. 4, 2016), https://www.rita.dot.gov/bts/
press_releases/bts018_16 [https://perma.cc/ZNX3-US7M], with STATISTICS CA-
NADA, 51-203-X, Air Carrier Traffic at Canadian Airports (2015), http://www.stat
can.gc.ca/pub/51-203-x/51-203-x2015000-eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/G6XP-ED
A2], and Overview of EU 28 Air Passenger Transportation by Member States in 2015,
EUROSTET (Nov. 28, 2016), http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/in
dex.php?title=FIle:Overview_of_EU-28_air_passenger_transport_by_Member_
States_in_2015.png&oldid=316243 [http://perma.cc/HVR8-H4UV].
155 Don’t Privatize Air Traffic Control, supra note 20.
156 Id.
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adequately day-to-day and has a positive safety record.158 How-
ever, these oft-used arguments considering uncertainty and
compliance with the status quo are poisonous stalemates to
innovation.
F. COMPARISONS TO PRIVATIZED AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL
AROUND THE WORLD
As briefly noted in Part II, supra, many countries around the
world have instituted some kind of privatized air traffic control
system. In fact, “[s]ince 1987, more than 50 nations have shifted
the responsibility for providing [air traffic control] services to an
independent entity.”159 Generally, reports have cited mostly pos-
itive impacts resulting from privatization.160 A 2005 study looked
at the privatized air traffic control systems of four countries—
Australia, Germany, New Zealand, and Switzerland—all of
which have systems that operate similarly to the privatized sys-
tem that President Clinton had proposed in 1994 involving
some form of federal oversight, a compromise which Congress
would likely create.161 The study hypothesized that
“[p]rivatization of the [air traffic control] system will result in
reduced operational cost and improved air traffic safety.”162 The
results of the study indicated that this hypothesis was true.163 Of
significant note were the following findings: three of the four
countries saw an increase in efficiency, two saw a decrease in
operating cost (one saw an increase and one saw no change),
and all four reported that they had the ability to modernize
their air traffic control systems within their new frameworks.164
Additionally, “[i]ncreased flight safety was indicated but could
not be measured or forecasted.”165 The study concludes in favor
of privatization with the observation that
158 Id.
159 Shuster, supra note 19.
160 Id.; Adams, supra note 8, at 25–26.
161 Adams, supra note 8, at 25.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 26 (“The results can be considered valid because the variables were
observed in an uncontrolled and naturalistic state. With an ex post facto design,
investigators have no control over the variables in the sense of being able to
manipulate.”).
164 Id. It is noteworthy that Delta Air Lines has made claims that air traffic
control costs “have increased more in Canada and Britain than in the United
States since they privatized.” Don’t Privatize Air Traffic Control, supra note 20.
165 Adams, supra note 8, at 26.
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[t]here is little reason to doubt that privatization would increase
efficiency thus reducing operating cost and increasing safety. Re-
duced operating cost would also come from personnel reduc-
tions and efficient equipment procurement procedures not
requiring present bureaucratic red tape. The literature review in-
dicated new equipment purchases would not have been possible
under previous rigid systems tied to government budgets. New
state of the art equipment would definitely increase safety regard-
ing air traffic control.166
While the conclusions of this study are significant indications
of the effectiveness of privatization, there are other important
considerations that add context to its results. One of the most
significant considerations is that the U.S. aviation industry, as
previously mentioned, is massive in comparison to those of
other major countries that have privatized air control.167 For ref-
erence, airlines serving the United States carried 895.5 million
passengers in 2015, making the United States “the largest and
most complex air transportation system in the world,” while the
United Kingdom and Germany recorded 232.3 million and
193.9 million passengers respectively.168 Canada, whose air con-
trol system is often looked to as a model for American privatiza-
tion, handled only 133.4 million passengers in 2015.169 Even the
2005 study cited above concedes that “[t]he factor of size and
volume of the U.S. [air traffic control] system as compared to
the systems of this study could possibly affect the outcome and
produce different results than indicated by this study.”170 A 2015
report by the FAA further details that
[t]here are significant differences between FAA and the foreign
[air navigation service providers] we reviewed, including their
operational and financing structures, as well as their approaches
to modernization efforts. Regardless, when examining possible
changes to FAA’s organizational structure, several factors should
166 Id.
167 AIR CARRIER TRAFFIC AT CANADIAN AIRPORTS: HIGHLIGHTS, supra note 154;
OVERVIEW OF EU-28 AIR PASSENGER TRANSPORT BY MEMBER STATES IN 2015, supra
note 154; 2015 U.S.-BASED AIRLINE TRAFFIC DATA, supra note 154.
168 FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, AV-2015-084, THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN FAA AND FOREIGN COUNTRIES’ PROCESS FOR OPERATING AIR
NAVIGATION SYSTEMS (Sept. 2, 2015), at 6; OVERVIEW OF EU-28 AIR PASSENGER
TRANSPORT BY MEMBER STATES IN 2015, supra note 154; 2015 U.S.-BASED AIRLINE
TRAFFIC DATA, supra note 154.
169 AIR CARRIER TRAFFIC AT CANADIAN AIRPORTS: HIGHLIGHTS, supra note 154.
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be considered, including size and complexity, aviation research
and development, and financing.171
In this report wherein the FAA looked at the air traffic control
systems of Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany, and France,
researchers came to the conclusion that it was difficult to extra-
polate results in these smaller countries to the United States’s
massive and comprehensive aviation industry.172 Regardless of
this impediment, however, the FAA concluded in this report
that the organizational structure of the FAA, or more specifically
the air traffic control system, was not as important as ensuring
that there is sufficient funding to maintain safety as the number
one priority.173 The FAA also looked to the experience of transi-
tion from government-controlled to corporation-controlled sys-
tems in other countries to recommend that specific attention is
paid to safety issues, financial considerations, and labor-manage-
ment relations during any transition period.174 Under this out-
look, as long as a proposed private corporation was sufficiently
funded, it would likely be successful.175
While there are undoubtedly complications in any effort to
compare the United States’s massive aviation industry to that of
any smaller country, we do not have any large-scale model which
could serve as a better reference. The United States’s volume of
air traffic is unparalleled and therefore no entity as large has
attempted privatization. However, looking at the experiences of
other major industrialized countries like the United Kingdom,
Germany, Canada, and Australia gives us the best insight availa-
ble into the results we might see if the United States ventures
down the privatization path. Further, it gives us data to make
comparisons between the options available within the privatiza-
tion framework. For example, the complete privatization model
of Canada and the United Kingdom and the government-owned
corporation model of Germany and France are both ideas that
have been discussed by congressional leaders and could both
possibly be embodied in the next privatization proposal.176 For
this reason, there is certainly value in studying and recognizing
the impact of privatization around the world, and as most coun-
171 THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FAA AND FOREIGN COUNTRIES’
PROCESSES FOR OPERATING AIR NAVIGATION SYSTEMS, supra note 168, at 3.
172 Id. at 6.
173 Id. at 9.
174 Id. at 8.
175 Id. at 9.
176 See Don’t Privatize Air Traffic Control, supra note 20.
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tries that have gone through the privatization process have
deemed it a success, these comparisons provide strong evidence
that privatization would be a positive move for the United
States.177
V. CONCLUSION
While there is no solution that will fix every problem in our
air traffic control system, we have to start somewhere. That start-
ing point should be some form of privatization. Privatization
checks the boxes of many policy interests that the aviation indus-
try wants to accomplish: saving taxpayers’ money, creating flexi-
bility to allow for much-needed innovation and modernization,
and creating a system that can expand and adjust along with the
growing air travel market.178 Opponents have expressed valid
policy concerns about privatization, including the need to main-
tain safety, the possible negative economic impacts, and the lack
of certainty about the impact of privatization, but these con-
cerns are largely speculative.179 Moreover, of the more than fifty
countries that have already privatized their air traffic control in
some capacity, most have deemed the transition to be a suc-
cess.180 Countries that have privatized have cited increased effi-
ciency, increased safety, and decreased costs, all of which are
major goals of the aviation industry of the United States.181 As to
regulatory concerns about privatization, the government would
have ultimate flexibility in drafting a regulatory proposal to cre-
ate a private corporation that has the freedom to innovate but
which also remains within the confines of necessary federal or
contractual oversight.182 All the while, however, the private cor-
poration would be lifting burdens off the federal government,
especially in the form of liability for negligence by air traffic
controllers.183
As of January 20, 2017, President Donald J. Trump and his
administration now oversee the Department of Transportation,
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178 See H.R. 4441: Aviation Innovation, Reform, and Reauthorization Act of 2016,
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and within it, the FAA and the current federalized air traffic
control system. With the Republicans now in control of the exec-
utive branch and both houses of Congress, many are optimistic,
though tentatively so, that headway will finally be made in ad-
dressing the concerns of the aviation industry.184 For years, pro-
gress in the industry has been halted by political gridlock.185
While Republicans can generally be counted on to operate out
of a pro-business framework, there is no guarantee that Presi-
dent Trump’s administration will follow this conservative prece-
dent.186 Indeed, there is little evidence that President Trump
has plans to prioritize aviation interests in his agenda.187 Many
in the industry eagerly await word on President Trump’s plans
for this important area of regulation.188
Representative Bill Shuster, champion of air traffic control
privatization in the House, won reelection to his Pennsylvania
seat in 2016 and has renewed his pledge to continue to fight for
privatization.189 Representative Shuster, a Trump supporter, has
reported that he has spoken directly with President Trump
about the idea of privatization and has claimed that President
Trump is interested in the idea of privatization and is open to
pursuing the matter further.190 Between the election and the in-
auguration, Representative Shuster also met with President
Trump’s transition team on transportation to discuss the
matter.191
As a further development, Senator John Thune (R-SD), Rep-
resentative Shuster’s counterpart in the Senate and chairman of
the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee,
has stated that the Senate, previously hostile to privatization, is
beginning to come around to the idea.192 He told reporters,
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“Congress has different options, and we will continue to explore
them, but the case for changing the FAA’s approach to air traf-
fic control modernization has become stronger.”193 Congres-
sional Democrats, however, still express caution towards the
idea.194 Generally though, in light of the new administration,
the continual failure of the FAA to achieve modernization, and
strong support within the aviation industry, privatization now
seems more likely than ever.195
The FAA has had fifty-nine years to establish an air traffic con-
trol system that can keep up with growing air traffic and ever-
changing technology, but budgetary constraints and
overburdened bureaucracy have held it back.196 It is time for the
United States to follow the global trend of privatization in order
to cement itself as an industry leader for the remainder of the
twenty-first century and beyond. With all three branches of fed-
eral government under the control of one party, there is no
time like the present to push through innovative legislation
without the resistance of political gridlock.197 Privatization of air
traffic control is not a perfect plan, but it is a strong first step
towards improving our aviation industry. Under the leadership
of President Trump, with the guidance of Representative
Shuster, and with the support of major airlines and major avia-
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